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Article I, § 8, as you know, grants Congress authority "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Congress exercised this authority from
the beginning, providing copyrights for authors and patents for inventors, to encourage their writings and discoveries respectively.'
As members of the House pointed out when the First Congress
refused to finance a scientific expedition to Baffin's Bay, however, the
clause in question gave Congress power only to provide for patents
and copyrights, not to promote knowledge generally.2 Congress's most
significant contribution to science and learning during the first half of
the nineteenth century was based upon quite another grant of authority.
Ever since George Washington was President there had been
proposals to establish in the District of Columbia, over which Congress had the power of "exclusive legislation," institutions that Congress might not have authority to set up elsewhere -such as a university, a vaccine agency, or a bank. So long as the institution was truly
local, bien entendu, there was no constitutional difficulty. Every endeavor to employ authority over the seat of government as a pretext
for evading limits on congressional powers within the states, however,
had so far been rightly rejected.'
Then, in 1829, an Englishman named James Smithson died, bequeathing to the United States (on certain contingencies that need
not concern us here) a substantial sum of money "to found at Wash-
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ington, under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an Establish-

ment for the increase & diffusion of knowledge among men."' The
requisite contingencies having occurred, President Jackson in late
1835 called Congress's attention to the legacy.5 Congress promptly

passed a statute authorizing the President to appoint an agent to pursue the claim before the British courts and appropriating up to
$10,000 to cover the attendant expenses. Once collected, the legacy

was to be applied, "as Congress may hereafter direct," to the object
specified in Mr. Smithson's will.6
Two years later, President Van Buren reported that the money
had been duly collected and deposited in the Treasury, where it
awaited Congress's further orders.7 Nearly a decade elapsed before
Congress responded, and the passage was rocky. But in August 1846
President Polk finally signed the bill establishing the Smithsonian Institution according to the terms of the bequest.!
Part of the delay stemmed from differences of opinion over the
nature of the projected institution. Rhode Island Senator Asher Robbins, reflecting the views of several prominent sages consulted at the
President's request, proposed a university; former President John
Quincy Adams plumped for an observatory, which he had once urged
Congress to establish with its own money., "In 1846, however, the
country was prepared to expect it to be a general agency for the advancement of scientific interests of all kindsfish,... [and] universal."10
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And so it was. The statute directed the Board of Regents of the

new Institution to construct a building in Washington containing
"suitable rooms" for "objects of natural history, including a geological
and mineralogical cabinet; also a chemical laboratory, a library, a gallery of art, and the necessary lecture rooms.""
All relevant objects belonging to the United States and located

in Washington, as well as Smithson's own collection, were to be transferred to the Institution. The Regents were also authorized to acquire
''new specimens" and instructed to compile "a library composed of
valuable works pertaining to all departments of human knowledge."

Interest from the bequest was appropriated to cover the Institution's
expenses, together with an unspecified sum from general revenues to

help cover the cost of construction. The principal was to remain untouched.'2
Thus Mr. Smithson's money was to be used chiefly to establish a

museum, a library, and other facilities not for the government's own
use but rather, in the terms of the will itself, "for the increase & diffu-

sion of knowledge." From the outset some had denied that that was
any of the government's business.
When President Jackson first referred Smithson's bequest to
Congress, both John C. Calhoun and his South Carolina colleague
William C. Preston predictably objected that Congress could not ac-

cept it. 3 Adams predictably replied in the House that Congress had
11 9 Stat at 104, § 5.
See id at 102-05, §§ 2, 5, 6, 8. Advances from the Treasury were to be repaid out of ac12
cumulating interest, but that did not make the project easier to sustain; even a loan must be justified as necessary and proper to some enumerated power. Interest not needed for purposes of
the Institution itself was to be expended as the Regents thought best "for the promotion of the
purpose of the testator." Id at 105-06, § 9. The following section, id at 106, § 10, required the
holder of any future copyright to deliver copies of the copyrighted work to the Institution and to
the Library of Congress, with no mention of compensation. The acquisition of books and other
works is necessary and proper to the establishment of libraries, but why it did not offend the
Takings Clause to make contributions to the Government a condition of copyright protection
seems to call for explanation.
13 See 12 Register of Debates in Congress 1375 (Gales and Seaton 1836) (Sen William C.
Preston) ("[The donation] was general in its terms, and not limited to the District of Columbia;
it was for the benefit of the United States, and could not be received by Congress"); id at 1376
(Sen John C. Calhoun) ("He understood the Senators, on all hands, to agree that it was not in
the power of Congress to establish a national university," and "[h]e thought that acting under
this legacy would be ... the establishment of a national university."). Calhoun repeated his objection in 1839. See Daily Natl Intelligencer 2 (Apr 8,1839), reprinted in Clyde N. Wilson, ed, 14
Papers of John C. Calhoun 576, 576-78 (South Carolina 1981). Preston added the quaint argument that the United States could not receive legacies even for national purposes, see 12 Register of Debates at 1374, but that was singularly unpersuasive; acceptance of private funding as an
alternative to taxation would seem necessary and proper to the exercise of each of the enumerated powers. On the other hand, the fact that in the end the Institution would soak up no tax
revenues made it harder rather than easier to sustain, for it meant one could not defend it on
the basis of President Monroe's broad reading of the spending power. See Currie, The Jeffersonians at 300 (cited in note 3).
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full authority to put the money to use in the District of Columbia.'
South Carolina Representative Alexander Sims returned to the attack
in 1846: Only a local legislature in the District could administer such a
legacy, as "the Government was not instituted for any such purposes
as the administration of charities"; and "[i]t was not intended that this
fund should be applied to the exclusive purpose of the use of the District of Columbia."'"
Congress passed the bill anyway, and that strict constructionist
James Knox Polk signed it into law. One can hardly avoid the conclusion that in so doing they played fast and loose with the power to legislate for the seat of government. For nobody pretended that the Institution was especially intended to serve the few residents of Washington; the debate was about creating a great national resource for the
whole country. The same was true when Congress established a national art gallery in 1860. 16 These were at least arguable cases, for District people would benefit from these institutions in common with
everyone else. The ruse had been laid bare, however, two months before the National Gallery bill was adopted, when Congress brazenly
established the United States Agricultural Society in the District of
Columbia-which even at that time was hardly renowned for either
its produce or its pigs.
One final aspect of the Smithsonian legislation deserves mention.
Section 1 of the statute described the Institution as an "establishment" consisting of an assortment of ranking federal officials, from
the President, Vice President, and Cabinet through the Chief Justice,
the Commissioner of Patents, and the Mayor of Washington.'8 Their
task was "the supervision of the affairs of [the] institution and the advice and instruction of [the] board of regents,,' 9 to whom the conduct
14
See 12 Register of Debates in Congress 79 (Gales and Seaton 1836) (Appendix). See
also id at 1375 (Virginia Sen Benjamin Leigh) ("Congress was the parenspatriae of the District
of Columbia ... and could therefore very properly receive this trust for a charitable purpose in
the District of Columbia."); id at 1376-77 (New Jersey Sen Samuel Southard) ("[I]n his opinion,
the most rigid construction of the constitution would not be adverse to the bill [establishing the
Smithsonian Institution]."). James Buchanan of Pennsylvania said it was all right because the
United States would be acting as trustee for Smithson's estate, id at 1377; he failed to explain
how that fiction connected the proposal with any of Congress's powers.
15 Cong Globe, 29th Cong, 1st Sess 738 (Apr 28, 1846). F.P. Stanton of Tennessee repeated
the simplistic answer: "[T]his institution, located within a territory over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction, surely cannot involve the exercise of a power unauthorized by the Constitution." Cong Globe App, 29th Cong, 1st Sess 891 (Apr 22, 1846).
16 See Act of June 15,1860, 12 Stat 35.
17 See Act of April 19,1860, 12 Stat 12.
18 9 Stat at 102.
19 Id at 105, § 8.The early members of the Establishment established a precedent of taking
their responsibilities lightly:

The Establishment, though exercising constant supervision over the affairs of the Institution, being represented upon the Board of Regents by two of its members,... has never
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of "the business of the ...institution" was entrusted.' Three members
of the Establishment (the Vice President, the Chief Justice, and the
Mayor) were to sit on the Board of Regents, along with three members of each House (to be chosen by their respective chambers), and
"six other persons" to be appointed "by joint resolution of the Senate
and House of Representatives."2' The Regents in turn were to elect a
"secretary" who, among other things, was to "take charge of the building" and "discharge the duties of librarian and of keeper of the museum"; in effect, he was to be chief executive officer of the entire Institution."
What was this Institution, anyway? If it were a government
agency, the provisions for its governance posed a nightmare of separation of powers problems. "Officers of the United States" were supposed to be appointed by the President and the Senate (or sometimes
by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the courts), not
by Congress or one of its Houses. 3 No one was supposed to hold "any
office under the United States" and a seat in Congress at the same
time." No member of the House or Senate was supposed to be appointed to "any civil office under the authority of the United States"
created during his term.2 Yet under the statute Congress named
members of the Board of Regents, Congressmen served as Regents,
and several were appointed during the term in which the Institution
was established. If Regents were federal officers, all of this was flatly
unconstitutional.26
deemed it necessary to take any formal action at its meetings, save to adopt ... a code of
by-laws, and to listen from time to time to general statements by the Secretary in regard to
the condition and affairs of the Institution.
George Brown Goode, The Establishment and the Board of Regents, in Goode, ed, The Smithsonian Institution 59,60 (cited in note 4).
20 9 Stat at 103,§ 3.
21 Id.
Id at 103, 105, §§ 3, 7. See Goode, The Establishment and the Board of Regents at 61
22
(cited in note 19) ("The executive officer of the Board of Regents is the Secretary of the Institution, who is elected by them. The duties and responsibilities of Secretary are such as in other institutions usually belong to the office of Director."). The provisions respecting the Establishment, the Board of Regents, and the Secretary remain substantially unchanged today. See 20
USC §§ 41-43,46 (2000).
23 US Const Art II, § 2. See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 124-41 (1976) (holding that certain
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violated the Appointments Clause, Art
II, § 2, cl 2).
24 US Const Art I, § 6.
25 Id.
26 Moreover, arguments against the inclusion of the Chief Justice can be made on the basis
of Article III, § 2, which limits federal courts to the decision of judicial "cases" and "controversies." From the beginning, however, judges for better or worse have accepted nonjudicial responsibilities to be exercised outside the court itself; there is no explicit bar to their holding two
offices at once, so long as they do not serve in Congress See Mistretta v United States, 488 US
361, 397-408 (1989) (holding that "the principle of separation of powers does not absolutely
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The statute did not say whether the Institution was a government

agency. Not every organization created by Congress is. The Bank of
the United States was not; it was a largely private corporation. The
Smithsonian, in contrast, was financed with money that had been
given to the United States, and its "Establishment" was made up entirely of federal officers.27 Both they and the Regents were unpaid for
their services to the Institution," but that seems immaterial; compensation is not central to the purposes of any of the relevant provisions.2
More pertinent, perhaps, is the fact that the Institution's functions
were proprietary rather than governmental; as an original matter one
might argue that the separation-of-powers provisions with which we
are concerned, like certain intergovernmental immunities, apply only
to the business of governing, not to government-run business.' One
prohibit Article III judges from serving on commissions"); Currie, FederalistPeriod at 209-10,
274 n 310 (cited in note 1) (discussing the diplomatic adventures of Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth). If the Regents could be characterized as "heads of departments," there was no difficulty
with the Secretary's selection, but the supervisory powers of the Establishment suggested that
its members, rather than the Regents, might occupy that position. For objections to the appointment of members of Congress based on the Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses, see
Cong Globe, 29th Cong, 2d Sess 191 (Jan 16,1847) (Florida Sen James Westcott) ("The office of
regent was a civil office-and the Constitution prohibited members of Congress from being appointed to any office created 'during the term for which they were elected."'); Cong Globe, 30th
Cong, 2d Sess 23 (Dec 11, 1848) (Tennessee Rep Andrew Johnson) (raising an incompatibility
objection to "the same individuals holding at the same time the office of members of Congress
•..and the office of regents of [the Smithsonian Institution]"). The Appointments Clause argument was apparently not made.
27
Stressing "the substantial federal funding" of the Institution and "the important supervisory role played by governmental officials," the D.C. Circuit held in 1977 that the Smithsonian,
as an "independent establishment of the United States," was a "federal agency" for purposes of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 2671 (2000). See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc v Smithsonian Institution, 566 F2d 289, 296 & n 6 (DC Cir 1977). Subsequently the
same court held that the Smithsonian was neither an "establishment in the executive branch of
the Government" (because not entrusted with the execution of laws or subject to Presidential
direction) nor an "authority of the Government of the United States" (because not exercising
"governmental authority") within the meaning of the Privacy Act, 5 USC § 552a et
seq (2000).
Dong v Smithsonian Institution, 125 F3d 877,878-82 (DC Cir 1997). Compare Cotton v Adams,
798 F Supp 22 (D DC 1992) (holding that the Smithsonian Institution is a federal agency under
the Freedom of Information Act, whose definitions the Privacy Act incorporates). The Smithsonian (as of November 2002) describes itself as a "trust instrumentality of the United States."
online at http://www.si.edu/oeema/LETSDOBZweb.html (visited Nov 13,2002).
28 See 9 Stat at 103, §3.
29 See Currie, The Jeffersoniansat 72 (cited in note 3) (discussing this question in
the context of the Incompatibility Clause of Article I, § 6).
30 Compare Dong, 125 F3d at 877-92 (immunity from Privacy Act). See also United
TransportationUnion v Long Island Rail Road Co, 455 US 678, 685 (1982) (erstwhile immunity
from federal regulation); South Carolina v United States, 199 US 437,452 (1905) (tax immunity);
Bank of the United States v PlantersBank, 22 US 904, 907-08 (1824) (immunity from suit). The
dangers of generalization in this field, however, are suggested by the wholly inappropriate application of the same distinction in the so-called "market participant" exception to the negative
effect of the Commerce Clause on state authority. See Reeves v Stake, 447 US 429, 436-39
(1980); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century 583-84
(Chicago 1990) (explaining how proprietary discrimination could be used to circumvent the

2003]

The Smithsonian

might also take refuge once again in the argument that if the Smith-

sonian was an agency of government, it was one of the District of Columbia: Territorial precedents had evinced the conviction that constitutional concerns over separation of powers were more attenuated in
local than in national matters, and the official line was that the Smithsonian was a creature of Congress's authority to legislate for the seat
of government.3
Overall the whole transaction was pretty shady from a constitutional point of view. But we got a pretty good set of museums out of it,
didn't we?"
Commerce Clause). Doubts as to the immunity of proprietary activities from separation-ofpowers concerns under present law, moreover, are suggested by Springer v PhilippineIslands,
277 US 189, 203 (1928), and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc, 501 US 252,267 (1991), both of which struck down on general
separation-of-powers principles provisions that envisioned the presence of legislators on managerial boards of public entities engaged in proprietary activities.
A House committee in 1899, building on congressional precedents subsequent to the establishment of the Smithsonian, concluded that members of advisory commissions, regents of public institutions, and similar animals were not "officers of the United States" within the meaning
of the incompatibility provision. Appointment of Members of Congress to Military and Other
Offices, HR Rep No 2205 pt 3, 55th Cong, 3d Sess 2-3 (1899) ("Directors and trustees of charitable or scientific institutions ... are practically and for common good sense only ministers of
science or public charity."). See also Buckley, 424 US at 138-39 (stating that officers appointed
by Congress could be authorized to act "in an area sufficiently removed from the administration
and enforcement of the public law to permit their being performed by persons not 'Officers of
the United States'); Johnny H. Killian and Leland E. Beck, eds, The Constitution of the United
States of America: Analysis and Interpretation:Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States to July 2, 1982 131-32 (GPO 1987).
31 For the territorial analogy, see Currie, The Jeffersonians at 109-13 (cited in note 3).
32 We also got that observatory that Mr. Adams had been pushing, but in an indirect (not
to say underhanded) way. In authorizing the President to hire astronomers for continuation of
the Coastal Survey in 1832, Congress had gone so far as to specify that nothing in the statute
should "be construed to authorize the construction or maintenance of a permanent astronomical
observatory." Act of July 10, 1832,4 Stat 570-71, ch 191 § 2. On the same day, however, Congress
appropriated $487.80 to reimburse Lieutenant Charles Wilkes for the expenses of building "astronomical instruments" for a naval exploring expedition. Act of July 10,1832,4 Stat 569, ch 187
§ 2. Before embarking, Wilkes, who was superintendent of the Navy's Depot of Charts and Instruments in Washington, had constructed a small observatory at his own expense to aid in the
rating and repairing of chronometers. His successor was directed by the Secretary of the Navy
to make astronomical observations in aid of the expedition. When he reported that existing facilities were inadequate, Congress authorized the expenditure of $25,000 for construction in the
District of Columbia of "a suitable house for a depot of charts and instruments of the navy," Act
of August 31, 1842, 5 Stat 576, §§ 1, 3, on the basis of a committee report making clear that an
observatory was a principal object of the bill. See Depot of Charts, &c, HR Rep 449,27th Cong,
2d Sess 3 (1842). The Secretary took this as authorization to construct what came to be known
as the Naval Observatory, and thus Adams was able to say in 1846 that he was "delighted that
an astronomical observatory ... had been smuggled into the number of the institutions of the
country, under the mask of a small depot for charts." Cong Globe, 29th Cong, 1st Sess 738
(1846). See Charles 0. Paullin, Early Movements for a NationalObservatory, 1802-1842, in John
B. Lamer, ed, 25 Records of the Columbia HistoricalSociety 36, 49-56 (Columbia Historical Society 1923) (chronicling the beginnings of the United States Naval Observatory); G. Brown
Goode, The Origin of the National Scientific and Educational Institutions of the United States
55-66 (G.P Putnam's Sons 1890).

